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THE SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE AS
APPLIED TO SECTION 8(B)(4) OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT
The right to strike is firmly ensconced in our nation's labor laws. Sec-
tion 13 of the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] provides that
"[n]othing ...except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."'
The Supreme Court also has recognized the right to strike, declaring that
the "use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a
grudging exception [to the policies of the National Labor Relations Act]
...it is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining."'2 Never-
theless, not all strikes are lawful. In addition to strikes involving violence,3
strikes in breach of no strike clauses,4 and strikes in violation of specific
statutory provisions, 5 a common form of unlawful strike is the secondary
boycott.
In contrast to a lawful strike, in which a union exerts economic pressure
upon an employer with whom it has a direct labor dispute,6 a secondary
1. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). See also the proviso to section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976), quoted in note 8 infra.
2. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
3. Strikes involving violence are condemned by both state and federal law. See UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (both the ends of a
labor dispute as well as the means used to accomplish those ends must be lawful).
4. No strike clauses are regarded as the quidpro quo for an employer's agreement to
arbitrate disputes. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976).
Strikes in violation of no strike clauses may be grounds for both injunctive relief and dam-
ages. Id. at 405. Seegeneraly F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR, 202-05 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BARTOSIC & HARTLEY].
5. See, e.g., section 8(d)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1976) (prohibiting
strikes within a period of sixty days after one of the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment gives notice of the intent to terminate or modify the agreement).
6. A lawful strike is a type of primary activity. Although the distinction between law-
ful primary and unlawful secondary activity is often a difficult one, § 8(b)(4) has never been
read to ban striking or picketing which attempts to prevent primary employees, customers,
and suppliers from crossing a picket line at the primary employer's premises. International
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Generally, two principal factors determine the nature
of primary and secondary activity: the status of the employer and the object of the union
exerting the pressure. See generally BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supra note 4, at 122-26.
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boycott attempts to enmesh a neutral employer in a labor dispute over
which it has no direct control. A secondary boycott exerts pressure upon
the neutral employer in order to induce the primary employer into settling
its own dispute. Effective secondary boycotts have predictable economic
effects. 7 While they intentionally disrupt the business of an employer di-
rectly involved in a labor dispute, they also interfere with a neutral em-
ployer's business, thereby preventing the supply of goods and services to its
customers.
For these reasons, Congress pronounced secondary boycotts illegal in
1947 by enacting section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. 8 When interpreting section
8(b)(4), courts have been guided by congressional objectives of preserving
the right of labor organizations to pressure offending employers in primary
labor disputes while shielding neutral employers from pressures in contro-
versies not their own. 9 To preserve the effectiveness of the strike weapon
7. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERVICE 1135, 1149. Although secondary activity may also be in the form of
strikes or picketing, unlike primary activity it attempts to force an employer to boycott
someone else. For instance, when one local of a union strikes employer A, it would be an
unfair labor practice for a sister union to strike against neutral employer B in order to pres-
sure that employer from doing business with employer A. Similarly, a union cannot law-
fully boycott employer B because employer B uses, sells, or handles employer A's goods. In
secondary strike and picketing situations, a neutral is being pressured to influence another
employer, and the pressured employer does not have any dispute with the picketers or strik-
ers. Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632 (1967).
8. The current working of § 8(b)(4)(B), formerly § 8(b)(4)(A), is:
8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or com-
modities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any per-
son engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or man-
ufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, . . . Provided, That
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
As it was first enacted, § 8(b)(4)(A) was more liberal than its subsequent amendment.
Under the original version, workers could lawfully appeal directly to secondary employers
and to individual employees of a secondary employer to aid a primary strike. They could
not, however, appeal to groups of employees, or a secondary employer, to aid a primary
strike. Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632-33 (1967); Local 761, Int'l
Union of Electrical Workers, 366 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1961).
9. Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-27 (1967), citing NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
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while balancing these conflicting congressional goals, the National Labor
Relations Board [NLRB or Board] and the courts have recognized two
major exceptions to section 8(b)(4), forming the so-called ally doctrine.' 0
The first exception is the struck work doctrine, under which an employer
may be the legitimate object of picketing" when it performs work for a
struck employer which, but for the strike, would have been performed by
the struck employer itself. Under the second exception, the single em-
ployer doctrine, commonly owned and controlled companies are treated as
a single employer, in certain circumstances, so that employees striking one
company may legitimately picket the other.' 2
While much has been written about the struck work branch of the ally
doctrine, the single employer doctrine has received minimal attention.' 3
To fill this gap, this comment analyzes the single employer doctrine as it
has been developed by the NLRB and the courts.14 Additionally, it pro-
poses that the doctrine be more liberally construed to enable courts to fo-
cus on the economic realities of labor disputes.
I. ORIGINS OF THE EXEMPTION
In reaction to a growing acceptance of certain kinds of secondary boy-
cotts by the courts,' 5 Congress, in 1947, enacted section 8(b)(4) as part of
10. See Asher, Secondary Boycotts--Allied, Neutral and Single Employers, 52 GEO. L.J.
406, 407-12 (1964).
11. The struck work doctrine was first enunciated in Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of
Architects, Eng'rs, Chemists & Technicians, Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
See note 28 infra for an explanation of the court's reasoning.
Under the struck work doctrine, a secondary employer is an ally when: (1) it does work
which would otherwise be done by the striking employees of the primary employer; (2) it
does such work knowingly; and (3) the work is done pursuant to an arrangement devised
and originated by the primary employer, whether or not the primary employer makes any
direct arrangement with the secondary employer. NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appli-
ance Mechanics Conf. Bd., Local 459, 228 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1955).
12. The doctrine was first enunciated in Nat'l Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards (Ir-
win-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
13. See Asher, supra note 10; Asher, Secondary Boycotts.- the Ally-Doctrine Revisited, 4
Loy. U.L.J. 293 (1973). See also Recent Decisions, 45 VA. L. REV. 293 (1959).
14. This article does not discuss the single employer doctrine as it has been applied in
determining jurisdictional amounts, e.g., Canton Carp's Inc., 123 N.R.R.B. 483 (1959), or
liability for unfair labor practices other than violations of § 8(b)(4), e.g., Western Union
Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976). It also will not explore what are called co-employer cases,
in which companies not commonly owned, but nevertheless exercising collective control of
common employees, are considered single employers. See Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Co-employer cases do not fall within the single
employer doctrine because they do not involve common ownership.
15. In the Senate committee report on the Labor Management Relations Act, the mi-
nority noted that courts were beginning to accept certain forms of action directed against
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the Taft-Hartley Act 16 This action grew out of a concern for the sheer
dollar amount of commerce lost in secondary strikes 17 and for the some-
times fatal damage incurred by small businesses.18 The number of work-
ers deprived of work by strikes and the inconvenience and hardship
suffered by consumers unable to obtain necessary products also motivated
congressional action.19
A minority in Congress, believing that certain types of secondary boy-
cotts should be permitted, launched an unsuccessful attempt to distinguish
secondary boycotts from primary strike activity on the basis of their objec-
tives.20 It proposed to distinguish between secondary boycotts aimed at
protecting wage rates and working conditions, 2' which the minority would
have protected, and those intended to aid jurisdictional strikes or to influ-
ence the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.22 At least one
senator argued that the failure to make this distinction not only denied
workers "the right to seek the co-operation of other workers in self-defense
but . . .[also the] essential civic rights of addressing themselves to their
fellow citizens about anything they want to present to them." 23
Although minority attempts to legitimize certain secondary boycotts
failed, language in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments
nevertheless suggested that the degree of a secondary employer's interest in
the outcome of a primary dispute might determine the legitimacy of a sec-
parties not immediately involved in a labor dispute when: (I) such parties are found to
possess "unity of interest" with disputing employer, and (2) such action is found to be neces-
sary in order to promote legitimate interests of the labor union. I S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2, 20 (1947) (minority views), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, 482 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRAJ.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1976).
17. See 93 CONG. REC. A 1222-23 (1947)(extension of remarks by Rep. Landis), re-
printed in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 15, at 583.
18. See 93 CONG. REC. 5060 (1947)(remarks by Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1370-71 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LRMA].
19. See 93 CONG. REG. A 1222-23 (1947)(extension of remarks by Rep. Landis), re-
printedin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 15, at 583; 93 CONG. REC. A
2377-78 (1947)(extension of remarks by Sen. Ball), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRA, supra note 18, at 1523-24.
20. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 15, Pt. 2, at 20-21, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 15, at 482-83; 93 CONG. REC. 5046-47 (remarks of Sen.
Murray), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 18, at 1366-67.
21. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 15, Pt. 2, at 20-21, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LMRA, supra note 15, at 482.
22. Id. at 481.
23. 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Pepper).
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ondary boycott.24 In addition, the literal wording of section 8(b)(4) sug-
gested an exception to the secondary boycott ban, since it premised the
illegality of a secondary boycott on the presence of an objective to force
any person from doing business with another. 25 Since the disruption of a
primary employer's business is clearly a legitimate goal of any strike, if
two employers are considered a single employer, the congressional goal of
preventing the spread of labor disputes to neutral employers is technically
not threatened, because no employer other than the primary employer will
be affected. Thus, a basis for developing a judicial exception to the sec-
tion's blanket condemnation of secondary boycotts derives from the face of
the statute itself as well as its legislative history.
The exception also finds support in a statement made by Senator Taft,
one of the sponsors of the 1947 amendments. Senator Taft declared that
the purpose of the secondary boycott provisions was to outlaw secondary
boycotts as a means of injuring the business of a third entity, "wholly un-
concerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees. '26
Although this statement was followed immediately by another disavowing
the distinction between good and bad secondary boycotts, 27 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York selectively fo-
cused on this language as a basis for establishing the struck work branch of
the ally doctrine. 28  Further vitality was given to the "wholly uncon-
24. The House committee report stated:
More often than not the [secondary] employers are powerless to comply with de-
mands giving rise to the activities, and many times they and their employees as
well are the helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all. These
activities the bill makes unlawful . . . and it removes the immunities that the pres-
ent laws confer upon persons who engage in them.
H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRA, supra note 15 at 314 (emphasis added). By stressing that the act was intended to
protect innocent employers from labor disputes not their own, this language provided the
basis for an exception to the secondary boycott prohibition in cases where the secondary
employer's involvement in the primary dispute obviated the underlying congressional policy
considerations.
25. For the wording of § 8(b)(4), see note 8 supra.
26. 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947) (emphasis added).
27. Senator Taft stated:
It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary
boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having
any one tell us the difference between diferent kinds of secondary boycotts.
Id.
28. Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, Eng'rs, Chemists & Technicians, Local
231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See text accompanying note II supra for a summary
of the doctrine.
The thrust of the court's reasoning was that the economic effect of the secondary employer
performing the primary employer's work was precisely that which would flow from the pri-
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cerned" language in a 1949 colloquy concerning the sweatshop conditions
of the garment industry between Senator Ives and Senator Taft, in which
Senator Taft offered a more precise interpretation of the 1947 amend-
ments:
[The secondary boycott ban] is not intended to apply to a case
where the third party is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a
part of the primary employer. . . . I do not believe the law was
intended to apply to the case [Senator Ives] cites, where the sec-
ondary employer is so closely allied to the primary employer as
to amount to an alter ego situation or an employer relation-
ship. . . .The spirit of the Act is not intended to protect a man
who is co-operating with a primary employer and taking his work
and doing the work which he is unable to do because of the
strike.29
Although this 1949 statement provides a stronger foundation for the single
employer doctrine than does the "wholly unconcerned" criterion espoused
in the 1947 remarks, the Board and the courts have relied for the most part
on the latter statement as evincing a congressional intent to protect only
certain classes of employers from secondary boycotts. The 1947 statement
has therefore formed the primary basis for the single employer doctrine. 30
mary employer hiring strikebreakers. 75 F. Supp. at 677. Noting that the secondary em-
ployer in the case was under contract to require its employees to work under the direction
and supervision of the primary employer, the court stated that "to suggest that [the secon-
dary employer] had no interest in the dispute between [the primary employer] and its em-
ployees is to look at the form and remain blind to [the] substance." Id. at 676 (emphasis
added). Foreshadowing an important element of the single employer doctrine, the court
also rejected the "insulation of legal interests between two businesses" as determinative of
neutrality in a labor dispute. Id. at 677.
29. 95 CONG. REC. 8709 (1949) (emphasis added). Arguably, the second part of the
statement quoted could indicate that Senator Taft was referring exclusively to the struck
work doctrine as set forth in Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672.
See notes II & 28 and accompanying text supra for a summary of the doctrine and the
reasoning. The comment by Senator Ives to which Taft was responding, however, did not
describe a struck work situation. Rather, the discussion concerned the integration of opera-
tions between two employers, an element of the single employer doctrine. See text accompa-
nying notes 48-67 infra for a discussion of the Board's application of the integration of
operations test. Thus, Taft's statement would seem to directly support the single employer
doctrine as measured by its functional integration test, in which employers who perform one
"straight line operation" are considered as one if they are commonly owned. The statement
also argues for an extension of the doctrine based on the actual support one employer may
give another during a labor dispute or on integration of operations even in the absence of
common control.
30. While lacking in precision, the notion of protecting only "unconcerned" employers
makes sense. One rationale for so limiting the protection of § 8(b)(4) is that, by definition,
an employer who is "concerned" in a dispute is both likely to be affected by the dispute in
any case, and is also probably in a position to influence its outcome. Employing this reason-
ing, a boycott of such an employer, would not expose that employer to substantial avoidable
[Vol. 28:555
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Section 8(b)(4) was amended in 1959, primarily to close certain loop-
holes left open by the 1947 amendments I.3  In contrast to the 1947 legisla-
tive history providing the "any other person" language from which the
courts established the single employer exception, the legislative history ac-
companying the 1959 amendment to section 8(b)(4) provided no further
basis for expanding the doctrine. At the same time, Congress considered
special exemptions from the secondary boycott ban for the construction
and the garment industries.32 The exemption for the garment industry,
however, was specifically based on the characteristic integration of func-
tions in that industry.3 3 This exemption alone was incorporated into the
amendment. Congress could have extended to all industries a general ex-
emption based on mere integration of operations but failed to do so. Such
an extension would have expanded the single employer doctrine by elimi-
nating the requirement of common control when integration of operations
existed.
Two unsuccessful proposals to liberalize the single employer exemption
to section 8(b)(4) were also introduced in 1959. Addressing the single em-
ployer doctrine, Senator Morse called attention to what he considered the
unfortunate findings by the courts that corporate subsidiaries were sepa-
rate employers, and that some employers were separate even though sub-
stantial common control and integration of operations existed.34 He
economic harm, but would allow a union to use economic force against an adversary em-
ployer who in all probability would oppose union interests. Such union activity is consistent
with the dual congressional objectives of protecting neutral employers from the effects of
labor disputes not their own and of preserving the effectiveness of the primary strike
weapon.
31. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257
201(e), 704(a)-(i), 705(a), 73 Stat. 525, 542, 545. See 105 CONG. REC. 1281 (1959)(Dept. of
Labor explanation), reprinted in NLRB, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 977 [hereinafter cited as 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT]; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78
(1959) reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2382. Under the original
language of § 8(b)(4)(A), workers could lawfully appeal directly to secondary employers and
to individual, although not to groups of, secondary employees to aid a primary strike.
32. See S. RES. 181, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 15905-06 (1959), reprin ed in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT, supra note 31, at 1383.
33. See note 32 supra.
34. Senator Morse stated:
Senator Taft said that the secondary boycott section 'is not intended to apply to a
case where the third party is, in effect, in cahoots with, or acting as a part of, the
primary employer.' The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have
failed to keep Senator Taft's concept in mind. The Board has considered subsidi-
aries to be separate employers. Other enterprises, substantially controlled by the
same persons, have been considered separate employers, even though one manu-
factured a product incorporated into the finished article produced by the other.
1979]
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introduced a proposal which would have reversed these court decisions
and exempted from section 8(b)(4) "businesses doing business with one
another when one is owned or controlled or is owned or controlled sub-
stantially in common. ' 35 By permitting businesses controlled "substan-
tially in common" to be treated as single employers in the absence of
common ownership, this proposal would have significantly expanded the
single employer doctrine.
A similar proposal, introduced several days prior to Senator Morse's,
was also rejected.36 The literal wording of the proposal suggested an ex-
emption for manufacturers involved in an integrated process of produc-
tion, even without common ownership. According to the accompanying
explanation, however, the proposal would have established a per se ex-
emption for employers who were ninety-five percent co-owners. 37 In a
sense, this proposal was more restrictive than Senator Morse's because it
would have required ninety-five percent common ownership before the ex-
emption operated. Nevertheless, it too would have expanded the single
employer doctrine by eliminating the common control requirement.
Two inferences can be drawn from the rejection of these two proposals.
First, by refusing to extend existing law, Congress arguably ratified and
intentionally froze the state of the law. Had this been the legislative intent,
however, it seems likely that Congress would have so stated explicitly, as it
did in ratifying the court-made struck work doctrine. 38 Second, and more
favorable to unions, Congress may have rejected the proposals because it
See 105 CONG. REC. 16395-96 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAN-
DRUM-GRIFFIN ACT, supra note 31, at 1425.
35. 105 CONG. REC. 16395-96 (1959). The specific wording of the proposal was:
Providedfurther, That for the purposes of section 8(b) of the Act, the phrases 'any
person' or 'other Person' will not be deemed to include the relationship between
(iii) businesses doing business with one another when one is owned or con-
trolled by the other or is owned or controlled substantially in common.
Id. at 16396, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT, supra note 31, at
1425.
36. S. RES. 181, 105 CONG. REC. 15906 (1959), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT, supra note 31, at 1383. The specific wording of the proposal
was:
Provided, That as used in this section and section 8(b)(4)(B) the terms . . . 'any
person'. . . or 'any other person' shall not include persons in the relation of. . .a
jobber or manufacturer and subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the
jobber of manufacturer or performing parts or an integrated process of production,
including jobbers, manufacturers, contractors, and subcontractors in the apparel
and clothing industry.
37. 105 CONG. REC. 15906 (1959)(explanation of S.REs. 181), reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT, supra note 31, at 1383.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE. CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2510.
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either found the single employer problem too insignificant or failed to
grasp its importance. The second inference would seem the more logical.
Although Senator Morse demonstrated his awareness of the Board and
court decisions formulating the single employer doctrine, the absence of
legislative history suggests that Congress as a whole was unaware of the
development of the doctrine, or at least unconcerned. Thus, the defeat of
the proposals to liberalize this exception to section 8(b)(4) is not conclusive
evidence of congressional intent to freeze the development of the single
employer doctrine. Instead, it is more likely that Congress simply refused
to take a leading role in the liberalization of the doctrine. By developing
the single employer doctrine, it may be argued that the Board and courts
assumed an extremely innovative role. In recognition of such innovation,
congressional silence in 1959 may be interpreted as a license for the Board
and courts to maintain their leadership in the development of the doctrine.
II. THE CASE LAW: A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFUSION
Although the 1947 and the 1959 legislative histories provide some basis
for the single employer doctrine and its expansion, neither suggested
guidelines for its application. Because the Congress was silent as to which
employers to protect from secondary boycotts, the Board and the courts
have tended to err on the side of protecting employers who arguably qual-
ify as primary employers under the single employer doctrine by finding
those employers to be secondaries. The congressional purpose of protect-
ing as far as practicable the effectiveness of the primary strike weapon has
been virtually ignored. 39 Tests developed by the Board and courts to de-
termine single employer status, although reasonable when viewed in the
abstract, have been applied restrictively without any articulated rationale,
thereby limiting what arguably might be primary activity.
The need for meaningful guidelines underlying the tests for determining
single employer status becomes clear when one considers the two most im-
portant criteria applied: common ownership and actual common con-
trol.4° The breadth of the "wholly unconcerned" justification renders the
requirement of common ownership superfluous, since companies which
are not commonly owned but have a high degree of interdependence are
also likely to be affected by each other's labor disputes and are likely to
39. See text accompanying note 9 supra for a statement of the congressional purpose,
and text accompanying notes 136-40 infra for arguments supporting the application of this
purpose to the single employer doctrine.
40. See J.G. Roy & Sons Co., v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (st Cir. 1958); American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists (Baltimore News Am. Div., The Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 593
(1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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render mutual aid during such disputes. Moreover, the technicality of the
"any other person" justification contradicts the rationale behind the com-
mon control requirement enforced in cases dealing with corporate subdivi-
sions that literally constitute one legal entity with the corporate parent. 4'
The need for a consistent rationale becomes even more apparent after
analyzing the other tests used to determine single employer status: the
amount of business done between the employers,42 the functional integra-
tion of the employers' operations, 43 the existence of common labor rela-
tions policies,44 and the presence of an arm's length relationship between
the employers. 45 When these tests are applied, the Board and courts tend
to lump together and confuse the factors of integration of operations and
common control.46 This confusion, combined with the low incidence of
integrated businesses, has narrowed the single employer exception. Fur-
thermore, common control over daily labor relations matters such as hir-
ings and firings, which can easily be manipulated by an employer to its
advantage, has been emphasized at the expense of factors such as joint
participation in labor negotiations.47 Moreover, the appearance of an
arm's length relationship, also easily manipulated by employers, is yet an-
other factor bearing no discernible relation to the structure of a labor dis-
pute. The resulting contradictions and restrictions have produced a
doctrine ill-suited to the determination of the parameters of a primary la-
bor dispute.
A. Integration of Operations
The first case to apply the single employer doctrine to an alleged viola-
tion of section 8(b)(4) was National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards
(Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.).48 Irwin-Lyons established the integration of
business operations as a test for determining single employer status. In
41. See text accompanying note 25, supra. For a discussion of the application of the
single employer doctrine to corporate subsidiaries, see text accompanying notes 109-49 infra.
42. See Retail Store Employees, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754,
756 (1976).
43. See Graphic Arts Int'l, Local 262 (London Press), 208 N.L.R.B., 39 (1973).
44. See American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 185 N.L.R.B. 593, 596-97.
45. See Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (Inland Concrete Enterprises, Inc.), 225
N.L.R.B. 209, 213 (1976). In evaluating whether an arm's length relationship exists, such
factors as the location of the businesses, the utilization of common facilities such as tele-
phones, and the employment of common services such as bookkeeping are considered. Id.
at 211.
46. See note 92 infra for a discussion of cases exhibiting this confusion.
47. See text accompanying notes 95-108 infra for a discussion of the Board's treatment
of common labor relations policies.
48. 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
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pursuance of a labor dispute, Irwin-Lyons employees had picketed not
only their own company, but also the Boom Company which transported
timber logged by Irwin-Lyons to the Irwin-Lyons mill. 49 The owners of
the Boom Company owned seventy-five percent of Irwin-Lyons' stock, the
president and secretary-treasurer of each company were the same, and the
Boom Company transported all of Irwin-Lyons' logs to milling.5 ° On
these facts, the trial examiner found that the companies were commonly
owned and controlled, that the operations of the Boom Company consti-
tuted only a phase of Irwin-Lyons' business of producing lumber, and that
the two organizations were "one economic enterprise." 5' Quoting Senator
Taft's "wholly unconcerned" statement, 52 the examiner held that the
Boom Company was not an unconcerned employer in the dispute with
Irwin-Lyons and that, due to the integration of its operations with Irwin-
Lyons, Boom was not "another employer" within the meaning of section
8(b)(4). 53 Although the common ownership of the companies was essential
to the trial examiner's determination, the trial examiner emphasized that
the case would have been entirely different had "mere pecuniary interest
alone" been the sole connection between the two enterprises. 54 On review,
the Board characterized the relationship between the two companies as
"one straight line operation" and adopted the trial examiner's findings and
conclusions. 55 The Board thus embraced the dual integration of opera-
tions and common ownership tests as determinative of single employer sta-
tus. 56
Irwin-Lyons thus established that common ownership alone furnished
insufficient grounds for invoking the single employer doctrine. It also ex-
panded the area of legitimate strike activity allowed under section 8(b)(4)
with minimal statutory and legislative support. Thus, in one sense, the
decision was pro-labor. The rationale underlying the dual integration of
operations and common ownership tests, however, indicates that the Board
intended the single employer doctrine to be a narrowly applied exception
to section 8(b)(4). The common ownership test represents a policy deter-
mination that mere business dealings with a struck employer should not be
49. Id. at 81, 83.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
53. 87 N.L.R.B. at 84. See also text accompanying note 25 supra.
54. Id. at 83.
55. Id. at 56.
56. The Board and courts have continued to stress the insufficiency of common owner-
ship. See note 81 infra for cases rejecting the importance of attributes of common owner-
ship.
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sufficient to subject another employer to a dispute not its own. 57 While
Irwin-Lyons itself provided no rationale for adding the integration of op-
erations test to the test of common ownership, later cases make clear that
common ownership alone is insufficient for determining single employer
status because it is so widespread. Moreover, in the view of the Board and
the courts, the congressional purpose of limiting the area of labor disputes
would be defeated by such a standard. 5
8
The integration of operations standard established by Irwin-Lyons also
demonstrates the narrowness of the single employer doctrine. In contrast
to common ownership, the existence of two or more companies which form
"one economic enterprise" is rare. In the recent case of Retail Store Em-
ployees, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 59 for example, the Board
failed to find an integrated operation between a title insurance underwriter
and five title insurance companies, even though over ninety percent of the
income of the five was derived from polices underwritten by the under-
writer whose written consent was required for commitments of insurance
coverage over a limit set for each company. 60 Similarly, in Dairy Employ-
ees, Local 754 (Glenora Farms Dairy) ,61 the Board failed to find that a
distributor of milk and its recently purchased processor constituted an in-
tegrated operation, even though the distributor purchased ninety-five per-
cent of its processed milk from the processor.
62
57. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (J.G. Roy & Sons Co.), 118 N.L.R.B. 286, 293
(1957)(Rogers, Member, dissenting), enforcement denied, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958).
58. See American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists (Baltimore News Am., Div. of
The Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 593, 600 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C.Cir. 1972);
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner, Div. of The Hearst
Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 305 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cerl. denied,
404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
59. 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976).
60. Id. at 755-56. Although on the facts stated it seems clear that the operations of the
title insurance company in Safeco were indispensable to the five insurance companies, the
Board merely commented that "the type and degree of collaboration between [the compa-
nies] ... is not such as to warrant a finding that [they] are engaged in an integrated business
operation," and that economic interdependency alone is not a sufficient basis on which to
predicate single employer status. Id. at 756.
A finding of integration of operations, however, would not necessarily have been decisive
in this case. While language in one case indicates that a finding of an integrated operation
may form the sole basis for single emloyer status, see Lithographers & Photoengravers, Lo-
cal 235 (Henry Wurst Inc.), 187 N.L.R.B. 490, 491 (1970), Safeco represents the general view
that "the degree of common ownership; the common control of day-to-day operations, in-
cluding labor relations; the extent of integration of business operations; and the dependence
of one employer on the other for a substantial portion of its business" are all factors to be
weighed and that none alone is sufficient. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756.
61. 210 N.L.R.B. 463 (1974).
62. Id. at 487, 490 (1974). The trial examiner emphasized that the companies were
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In practice, the courts have found an integration of operations only
when the facts in each instance virtually dicated such a conclusion. In
Lithographers and Photoengravers, Local 235 (Henry Wurst), 63 for exam-
ple, a printer, a book binder, and a mailing service qualified as an inte-
grated operation. All three were located in the same building, seventy-five
percent of the printer's bindery and mailing work was done by the mailing
house, and all three met once a week to coordinate operations.64 Similarly,
in Graphic Arts International, Local 262 (London Press),65 a printer, pub-
lisher, and distributor were found to be involved in an integrated opera-
tion when both the printer and the distributor exclusively handled the
publisher's materials.66 Both cases presented unusual situations which
rarely can be matched.
By focusing so narrowly on the business relationships, these cases fail to
recognize the decisive role which can be played by common ownership in a
labor dispute and its legitimacy as a basis for strike and picketing activ-
ity. 67 A labor union seeking to sustain a strike will understandably
reevaluate its prospects for success once it becomes aware that the struck
company, supported economically by a sister company, is in a strong posi-
tion to withstand a strike. Failure to expose the sister company providing
such assistance to union picketing allows the struck company the advan-
tage of the other's economic arsenal and protects the second company
from the very warfare in which it willingly participates. In view of these
realities, the emphasis by the Board and the courts on integration of opera-
separately operated, thus implying that the basis for the decision was a lack of common
control. For the relation between common control and integration of operations, see note 60
supra, and see text accompanying notes 68-94 infra for a discussion of the test of actual
common control.
63. 187 N.L.R.B. 490 (1970).
64. Id.
65. 208 N.L.R.B. 37 (1973).
66. Id. at 38. See also Building Serv. Employees, Local 32-J (Terminal Barber Shops),
135 N.L.R.B. 909 (1962), enforcement denied, 313 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1963)(barber shop
chain and wholly owned purchaser and distributor of supplies held single employer); Team-
sters Local 249 (Polar Water Co.), 120 N.L.R.B. 155, 157-58 (1958) (bottlers and distributors
of water and root beer which occupied same plant and whose employees performed the
same functions for both held single employer).
67. A critic of the single employer doctrine has stated:
The decisive consideration for the purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) is whether the eco-
nomic pressure exerted strikes the same purse, and curtailment of income hits the
same people, regardless of which of their legal entities holds the purse strings.
Such pressure is designed to turn inchoate control into active control, thus provid-
ing the very criteria for lack of which the Board is given to invoking 8(b)(4)(B).
Asher, supra note 10, at 418.
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tions at the expense of common ownership is a fundamental flaw in the
single employer doctrine.
B. Actual Common Control
In two early decisions, the Board abandoned the integration of opera-
tions and common ownership test as the sole basis for single employer sta-
tus and began to utilize a test of common control. In each application, the
Board liberalized the single employer doctrine, resulting in a finding of
single employer status.68 Ultimately, however, each Board determination
was reversed by the courts, thereby narrowing the common control test in
favor of employers.
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (J.G Roy & Sons
Co.),69 the Roy brothers owned lumber and construction companies and
served as each company's board of directors. 70 The trial examiner, in a
careful analysis of the facts, noted that although the powers of manage-
ment were vested in the board of directors by the by-laws, actual manage-
ment of the companies was carried on by corporate officers unrelated to
the Roys.71 He concluded, however, that regardless of whether there was
in fact interference with management functions, the brothers had the
power to make managerial decisions and to direct the labor relations of
both entities; therefore, they were in a position to resolve the dispute. 72
The Board found that the commonly owned construction and lumber com-
panies constituted a straight line operation because the lumber company
supplied all of the construction company's millwork requirements. 73 Inte-
gration of operations, however, was explicitly rejected as a prerequisite for
the finding of single employer status; common ownership and control were
held to be sufficient in themselves.74 Dissenting Board member Rogers,
however, found that the failure of the companies' boards of directors to
68. Neither case would have sustained a finding of single employer status based on
integration of operations. See text accompanying notes 73, 77 & 84 infra.
69. 118 N.L.R.B. 286 (1957), enforcement denied, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958).
70. 118 N.L.R.B. at 196-97. All five brothers constituted the membership of the board
of directors of Roy Construction, and four of the brothers constituted the membership of the
board of directors of Roy Lumber. Id. at 297.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 299. The trial examiner also noted that the five brothers shared equally in the
profits and losses of the companies, regardless of which company each controlled. Id. at
299. Thus, each brother, regardless of his formal role in company affairs, presumably would
have been concerned with the running of each company and would have had a motive for
interference if the company fared badly.
73. Id. at 287.
74. Id. at 287-88. The Board did not discuss the trial examiner's reasoning concerning
his finding of common control.
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exercise their legal powers of control indicated a de facto lack of common
control.7" He also disagreed that common ownership and contiol were
sufficient to establish single employer status.
76
On petition to review the Board's order, the First Circuit denied enforce-
ment, characterizing the Board's finding of integration of operations as
strained.77 Comparing the case with Irwin-Lyons, the court read Irwin-
Lyons to warrant a finding of integrated operations only when the secon-
dary employer's operations were an absolutely essential and integral part
of the primary employer's enterprise. 78 In the case at issue, however, the
court emphasized the conflicting viewpoints of the Board majority and dis-
sent and reasoned that no actual common control was present between the
Roy companies. Consequently, it held that the potential to exercise com-
mon control was an insufficient basis for finding a single employer rela-
tionship because potential common control is always possible where there
is common ownership. 79 In comparing potential control situations with
situations involving struck work, the court sanctioned secondary activity
only in the latter case, since the employees of a primary would be consider-
ably disadvantaged in their dispute unless they could pressure the employ-
ees of a secondary employer to cease performing the farmed out struck
work.80 The court thus implied that employees are not disadvantaged by
75. Id. at 289, 292 (Rogers, Member, dissenting).
76. Id. at 293. The primary basis for Rogers' disagreement with the majority was his
belief that the exceptions to § 8(b)(4) should be limited to cases in which struck work is
being performed or in which there is an integration of operations. Id. His basis for such a
limitation, oddly, was the 1959 statement of Senator Taft, quoted in the text accompanying
note 29 supra, which, on its face, appears to be support for the single employer doctrine. See
discussion in note 29 supra. Rogers specifically found that the companies were wholly in-
dependent of each other except for occasional buying and selling. Id. at 289. Especially
critical of the majority's treatment of the lumber company's provision of millwork to the
construction company, he stated that under the Board's decision, "the public policy of the
Act can be defeated by the mere coincidence of common ownership and ordinary buying
and selling." Id. at 293. Rogers also protested that in the present case, the employees of the
construction company, induced by their union to strike in order to force the construction
company to pressure the lumber company into recognizing the union, were in reality
trapped in a dispute which did not concern them. Id.
77. J.G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771, 773-74 (1st Cir. 1958).
78. Id. at 773.
79. Id. This holding was consistent with the view, already implicitly accepted by the
Board, that common ownership is insufficient simply becasuse it is so widespread. See notes
57 & 58 and accompanying text supra. See also note 81 infra for cases rejecting the signifi-
cance of attributes of common ownership.
80. Id. at 775. The court also agreed with member Rogers' dissent in finding that the
employees of the construction company were essentially trapped in a dispute which did not
concern them. See note 76 supra.
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the inability to combat a secondary employer's potential intervention in
their dispute.
The court's rejection of potential control as a single employer test is
ironic. Its reasoning, that potential common control is always possible
where there is common ownership, is precisely the reason that common
ownership should be sufficient.8 ' As the trial examiner had stated, posses-
sion of potential common control means being in a position to resolve a
dispute.82 But if potential common control can be used to resolve a dis-
pute, it also can be employed to prolong one. The court's reasoning appar-
ently reflected a concern that the single employer exception would become
too broad when measured against the policy of preventing the spread of
labor disputes. Its failure to consider seriously that potential control sub-
sumes the power to resolve a dispute also indicates a failure to consider the
competing policy of preserving the effectiveness of the primary strike
weapon. The peremptory conclusion that potential common control is less
threatening to a strike than the performance of struck work underscores
this failure.
On remand, the Board accepted the First Circuit's interpretation but ad-
hered to the views expressed in its original determination. 83 In the next
single employer case to come before it, however, the Board bowed to the
81. See Asher, supra note 10, for one critic's argument that potential common control
should be sufficient basis for single employer status. J. G. Roy thus illustrates the proposition
that common ownership is insufficient to establish single employer status. Accord, Miami
Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346
(1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Board and courts have followed this
principle by rejecting as indications of single employer status any characteristics which can
be said to be inherent in common ownership. While some of these characteristics are rela-
tively inconsequential, e.g., NLRB v. General Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees,
Local 126, 435 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1970) (co-signing of paychecks), other characteristics are
more significant and their potential effect on the resolution of labor disputes deserve analy-
sis. See, e.g., General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749 (Transport, Inc.), 218 N.L.R.B.
1330 (1975), enforced, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (president's voting control over two
companies through stock ownership); Packinghouse Employees, Local 616 (Southwest For-
est Industries, Inc.), 203 N.L.R.B. 645 (1973) (corporate parent's monthly review of subsidi-
ary's finances); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner), 185
N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971) (financial reporting require-
ments and remission of excess profits to corporate parent); Dallas Gen. Drivers, Local 845
(Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas, Inc.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1957), enforced, 264
F.2d 642 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959) (stock ownership in wholesaler-supplier
by cooperative retailer members, and distribution of dividends in proportion to purchases).
82. JG. Roy, 118 N.L.R.B. at 299.
83. J.G. Roy, 120 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1958) (supplemental decision and order). The Board
explicitly stated that "nothing contained herein is to be taken as abandonment by Chairman




First Circuit's actual control test. Warehouse and Distribution Workers,
Local 688 (Bachman Machine Co.) involved manufacturers of plastic cus-
tom parts and tools. 84 The same individual was president of both compa-
nies and also owned approximately seventy percent of the stock of each.85
Adopting the trial examiner's findings that the president admittedly con-
trolled the tool manufacturer's labor relations and also actively repre-
sented the plastics company in the negotiations concerning the strike in
question, the Board found actual common control. 86
On petition to review the Board's order, the Eighth Circuit denied en-
forcement. 87 The court emphatically disagreed with the Board's applica-
tion of the actual common control standard, stating that the two companies
did not qualify as a single employer merely because the president con-
trolled the labor relations of both companies.88 It emphasized, however,
that its holding was a narrow one, going no further than to reject the suffi-
ciency of the president's participation in labor negotiations for a finding of
single employer status.89 Reasoning that the Board's conclusion was in-
consistent with the congressional purpose of shielding unoffending em-
ployers from controversies not their own, the court suggested that a
different problem would have been presented had the president actually
joined with the plastics company in resisting the strikers' demands.90 The
Eighth Circuit thus impliedly rejected the basis for the actual common
control standard established by the First Circuit in JG. Roy. The dissent
disagreed with the majority's characterization of the tool manufacturer as
an unoffending employer, reasoning that the president of the company
84. 121 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1232 (1958), enforcement denied, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959).
The plastics company used molds manufactured by the tool manufacturer in the process of
molding approximately half of its custom parts. Similarly, the majority of the plastics parts
used by the tool manufacturer were supplied by the plastics company. The companies' sales
to each other, however, constituted only one-fifth of their gross sales. 121 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
85. Id. Other members of the president's family also owned stock in both companies
and served as officers. Both boards of directors were comprised of the officers of each com-
pany. Id.
86. Id. at 1233. The president had dominated all of the negotiating sessions that were
held concerning the strike. All sessions were held on the plastics company's premises. Id.
Member Rogers again dissented on the ground that mere common ownership and control
should be insufficient for finding single employer status. Id. at 1230 (Rogers, Member, dis-
senting). Rogers also thought that the facts of Bachman were not sufficiently different from
those of J G. Roy to warrant finding a single employer. Id.
87. Bachman Machine Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959).
88. Id. at 605. The court quoted in full Rogers' dissent in Bachman and also restated a
substantial portion of his dissent in JG. Roy. Id. at 603-04.
89. Id. at 605.
90. Id. The court also stated that integration of operations or the performance of struck
work would have justified an exemption from § 8(b)(4).
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could not be considered wholly disinterested in a labor dispute in which he
had actively bargained with the plastics company's employees and "ren-
dered a decision against them with such finality that they went on strike to
coerce him." 91
In spite of the Eighth Circuit's near outright rejection of the test, actual
common control has remained a primary test for finding single employer
status, both for the Board and a majority of the courts. 92 JG. Roy's rejec-
tion of the role of potential common control in the resolution of labor dis-
putes has been mirrored in virtually all subsequent case law. 93 Bachman
Machine Co., for its part, has foreshadowed a line of cases which reject the
significance of such factors as an officer's participation in collective bar-
gaining in favor of greater emphasis on control of day-to-day operations in
determining actual common control.94 Together, these cases, more than
91. Id. at 606 (Woodrough, C.J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, Local 745, 264 F.2d 642 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959); Local 810, Steel, Metals, Alloys, Hardware Fabricators &
Warehousemen, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Sid Harvey, Inc.), 189 N.L.R.B., 612 (1971), en-
forcement denied, 460 F.2d I (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
In Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
the single employer test was stated as consisting of "common control, . . denoting as ac-
tual, as distinct from merely a potential, integration of operations and management poli-
cies." Citing Local 46, the Board stated in Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters (Poole's Warehousing, Inc.), 158 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1966), that "(t]here must
be in addition [to common ownership] such actual or active common control, as distin-
guished from merely a potential, as to denote an appreciable integration of operations and
management policies." Id. at 1286. The Board and courts have often quoted language in
Poole's Warehousing, but they have failed to explicitly articulate whether they were apply-
ing the common control or integration of operations test. See General Drivers & Helpers
Local 749, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Transport, Inc.), 218 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1975), enforced, 543
F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The confusion of the common control and operational integra-
tion tests, while undesirable, is consistent with the prevailing view that integration of opera-
tions is merely one of several factors to be considered. See note 60 supra. The confusion is
also indicative of the narrowness of the single employer exception, since the presence of any
one of the factors considered does not necessarily establish single employer status, see note
60 supra, and since the absence of any one factor may be used to deny the status. See
Packinghouse Employees, Local 616 (Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.), 203 N.L.R.B. 645
(1973); Local 810, Steel, Metals, Alloys & Hardware Fabricators, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Sid Harvey, Inc.), 189 N.L.R.B. 612 (1971), enforcement denied, 460 F.2d I (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
93. Eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 391 (Chattanooga Div., Vulcan Materi-
als Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 540 (1974).
94. See text accompanying notes 95-108 infra for a discussion of cases dealing with
common labor relations policies. Bachman is representative of this line of cases because it
rejected what should have been strong indication of the power of one company over another.
This rejection caused one court to express doubt whether under Bachman even a definite
finding of common labor relations would be sufficient to establish single employer status.
Roumell v. Miami Printing Pressmen's Local 46, 198 F. Supp. 851, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
Bachman, however, did not directly suggest a placement of greater emphasis on day-to-day
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any others, have determined the narrowness of the single employer excep-
tion to section 8(b)(4).
C. Common Labor Relations Policies
In addition to considering the integration of operations and common
control in determining single employer status, the Board and the courts
also consider other criteria, including the extent of business relations be-
tween employers, the presence or absence of an arms-length relationship,
and, most significantly, the existence of a common labor relations policy.95
Consideration of a common labor relations policy in determining single
employer status appeals to a sense of justice: workers ought to be able to
strike and put economic pressure on the party responsible for resisting
their demands96 or for controlling their terms and conditions of employ-
ment.97 Accordingly, it would make sense to consider not only an em-
ployer's control over the terms, conditions, and fact of employment-what
are termed day-to-day labor relations-but also the employer's power both
to intervene in labor relations in times of crisis such as strikes or contract
disputes, as well as to exercise this power.
In Royal Typewriter v. NLRB,98 an unincorporated division of a corpo-
rate subsidiary controlled its own day-to-day labor relations. The parent
operations. Instead, the court indicated in its "common cause" dicta, see text accompanying
note 90 supra, that it would have required some sort of extraordinary interference by one
company in the other's labor relations. Only one case has predicated single employer status
on such action. See Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d
1030 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision to shut down plant's operations).
95. See American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, Washington - Baltimore Local
(Baltimore News American, Div. of The Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 593, 599 (1970), en-
forced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Squillacote v. Drivers, Salesmen & Warehouse-
men, Local 695, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 52 Lab. Cas. 16,638 (W.D. Wis. 1965); Royal
Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); Local
810, Steel, Metals, Alloys & Hardware Fabricators, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Sid Harvey,
Inc.), 189 N.L.R.B. 612 (1971), enforcement denied, 460 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1041 (1972); Local 235, Lithographers & Photoengravers (Henry Wurst, Inc.). 187
N.L.R.B. 490 (1970). But see Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Acme Concrete & Supply
Corp.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962).
96. See Bachman Machine Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599, 606 (8th Cir. 1959) (Wood-
rough, C.J., dissenting), denying enforcement of 121 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1958).
97. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner, Div. of The
Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 320 (1970) (opinion of trial examiner), enforced, 443 F.2d
1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
98. 533 F.2d 1030, 1042 (8th Cir. 1976), enforcing 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974). Royal
Typewriter involved § 8(a)(5) rather than § 8(b)(4). Nevertheless, the case is important be-
cause of its reasoning, endorsed by Judge Bazelon in Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976), enforcing 208 N.L.R.B. 540 (1974). See notes 100-04
and accompanying text infra.
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retained sufficient control, however, so that during a strike it was able to
shut down the division's operations, thereby determining the course of the
contract negotiations. In finding that the parent and the subdivision con-
stituted a single employer, the Eighth Circuit reasoned:
In assessing the appropriateness of single employer treatment, the
fact that day-to-day labor matters are handled at the local level is
not controlling.... A more critical test is whether the controlling
company possessed the present and apparent means to exercise
its clout in matters of labor negotiations by its divisions or sub-
sidiaries and whether its course of conduct encouraged or permit-
ted the local negotiators to so represent the situation to union
negotiators for the purpose of achieving a tactical or strategic ob-
jective. 99
This statement was quoted in full by Judge Bazelon of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Local 391, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB.100 In that case, the District of
Columbia Circuit, ignoring the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Royal
Typewriter, held that because of the lack of common control over day-to-
day labor relations, two corporate subdivisions were separate employers,
in spite of the participation by the parent corporation's industrial relations
officers in the subdivisions' strike negotiations.' 0 ' In its per curiam deci-
sion, the court emphasized that the president of each subdivision had the
authority to formulate individual labor relations policies as well as to ne-
gotiate and execute collective bargaining agreements, and that the parent's
industrial relations officers participating in the strike negotiations did so at
the invitation and under the authority of the subdivisions' presidents. 0 2
Judge Bazelon characterized as "deceptively simple" the Eighth Circuit
rule classifying separate corporate divisions as separate persons under sec-
tion 8(b)(4) when neither the division nor the parent exercised actual con-
trol over the daily labor relations of the other. In a parent-subsidiary
situation, he reasoned, an evaluation of neutrality must consider the extent
to which a corporation is supporting, or appears willing to support, its divi-
sions in their labor disputes. 0 3 Whether such support is financial or stems
from the participation by the parent's officials in the negotiations of the
99. 533 F.2d at 1043 (citations omitted).
100. 543 F.2d 1373, 1379, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977), enforcing
208 N.L.R.B. 540 (1974). Although Judge Bazelon joined in the per curiam opinion he
wrote a separate statement explaining his reason for joining the court's decision to deny the
union's petition for rehearing en banc. 543 F.2d at 1373.





divisions, Judge Bazelon considered the crucial question to be whether the
parent thereby gains a tactical advantage over the union by causing it to
conclude that it faces the full economic might of the corporation.1°4
Judge Bazelon's reasoning should be applicable to any common owner-
ship situation in which one company dominates, or has the power to domi-
nate, another. His consideration of the tactical advantages flowing from
the relationship between two companies is, however, unique. While a few
cases give weight to factors such as the actual intervention in labor dis-
putes or the use of common tactics to combat strikes,' 05 most give control-
ling weight to such factors as separate control over hiring and firing and
lack of interchange of personnel. 0 6 Such factors as use of parent or re-
lated company's advisors during negotiations are discounted, unless the
advisors have proven ultimate authority. 0 7 Thus, the Board and the
courts have ignored not only the significant tactical advantages that may
flow to companies from an apparently united front, but also the potential
for actual intervention by one in the event of a crisis.'0 8 In view of such
omissions, the consideration of common labor relations policies is obscure,
104. Id. at 1377-78.
105. See NLRB v. General Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Local 126, 435
F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1970) (companies belonged to separate employer associations and had
employed different tactics in a recent strike); Squillacote v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 695, 355 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Wis. 1965) (president actively controlling labor relations
of one company actively intervened in the other's labor dispute); Madden v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 743, 262 F.2d 812 (E.D. Wis. 1959)(manager of company took no action
against picketing until after consultation with parent corporation).
106. See Phillips v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 391, 70 Lab. Cas. 13,371
(E.D. Tenn. 1972); Penello v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 291 F. Supp.
409 (D. Md. 1968); Roumell v. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen, Local 46, 198 F. Supp.
851 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (Inland Concrete Enterprises,
Inc.), 225 N.L.R.B. 209 (1976); General Drivers & Helpers, Local 749 (Transport, Inc.), 218
N.L.R.B. 1330 (1975); Local 295, Air Frieght Chauffeurs (Pandair Freight, Inc.), 218
N.L.R.B. 480 (1975); Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Vulcan Materials Co.), 208
N.L.R.B. 540 (1974), enforced, 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Miami Newspaper Printing
Pressmen, Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346, enforced, 322 F.2d 405
(D.C. Cir 1963). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 563 (Inland Trucking Co.),
186 N.L.R.B. 219 (1970) (history of joint labor negotiations and common strategy in prior
disputes discounted because daily labor relations handled separately).
107. See Phillips v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 391, 70 Lab. Cas. 13,371
(E.D. Tenn. 1972); Pennello v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 291 F. Supp.
409 (D. Md. 1968); Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (Inland Concrete Enterprises, Inc.),
225 N.L.R.B. 209 (1976); Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Vulcan Materials Co.), 208
N.L.R.B. 540 (1974), enforced, 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 697
(1977); Miami Newspaper Printing Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346
(1962).
108. While it would seem that analysis of the potential for active intervention is highly
relevant to the task of designating legitimate opponents, such analysis probably would be
held to be irrelevent by the Board and courts because it is an indication of "potential" rather
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unless as with the functional integration test, it functions merely to limit
the application of the single employer doctrine.
D. Wholly Owned Corporate Subsidiaries and Divisions
In spite of the early attempts to liberalize the single employer doctrine in
JG. Roy and Bachman Machine,0 9 the Board has proven to be as strin-
gent as the courts in its later applications. A prime example is the Board's
treatment of wholly owned corporate subsidiaries and divisions.
The argument has been made that secondary activity should be allowed
in any case of common ownership because the profits of one entity are
likely to be used to support another in times of economic pressure. "10 This
argument is especially strong in the case of corporate subsidiaries and divi-
sions, often formally connected through financial reporting systems and
profit passover arrangements.III The argument nevertheless has been re-
jected both in the case of companies commonly owned by individuals and
in the case of common corporate ownership. The Board presently applies
the same single employer tests to both.
Two early Board cases indicated that corporate subsidiaries and divi-
sions would be treated as single employers without meeting the require-
ment of actual common control. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 200 (Milwaukee Plywood Co.), 112 the Board held that because the
Milwaukee Plywood Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Aetna
Plywood and Veneer Company, Milwaukee was engaged in a labor dis-
pute with the union representing the parent company's employees.' ' 3 In
International Brotherhood of Teamster, Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse
and Sales Co.), the Board likewise permitted a union engaged in a dispute
with a warehouse company to picket all three of the company's warehouse
locations.' 14 Furthermore, language in the latter decision indicated that
picketing each branch of an employer's enterprise was per se lawful pri-
than active control. See Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local 46 (Knight Newspa-
pers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1350-51 (1962).
109. See text accompanying notes 68-94 supra for a discussion of the Bachman Machine
and J G. Roy cases.
110. Asher, supra note 10, at 418.
I11. See Packinghouse Employees, Local 616 (Southwest Forest Indus., Inc.), 203
N.L.R.B. 645, 646 (1973); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Exam-
iner, Div. of The Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 320 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th
Cir. 1971).
112. 126 N.L.R.B. 650, 651 (1960).
113. None of the parties in Milwaukee Plywood argued that the companies were not al-
lies. Id. at 654.
114. 128 N.L.R.B. 916, 918-19 (1960).
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mary activity." 5 Other language, however, emphasized that the branches
of the company in question were engaged in an integrated operation, and
that picketing would be allowed because, under the circumstances, the
continued operation of all branches could have been decisive in determin-
ing the outcome of the dispute.' 6
Because neither Alexander Warehouse nor Milwaukee Plywood actually
discussed the single employer doctrine, neither provided compelling prece-
dent when the Board first considered the doctrine's applicability to corpo-
rate subsidiaries in the context of section 8(b)(4). Two other early cases,
however, did discuss the single employer doctrine and indicated that the
requirement of actual common control would be applied to corporate sub-
sidiaries and divisions." 7 These cases involved chainshop clauses, which
provided that the companies would not request their employees to handle
any work of another plant either wholly owned and controlled by the com-
panies or commonly owned and controlled if that company were on strike
or locked out." 8 In Amalgamated Lithographers of America, Local 78
(Miami Post Co.) the Board upheld the clause, interpreting it to sanction
sympathy strikes only as long as the companies involved were commonly
owned and controlled, thus constituting a single employer within the
meaning of the Act. 119 The clause was held to be unlawful in Amalga-
115. The Board stated:
Though the economic dispute with Alexander directly involved only Alexander's
Joliet employees, Respondents had the right to bring pressure upon Alexander at
each and every one of its warehouses. The Peoria and Urbana warehouses are no
more to be considered neutral premises for the purpose of applying Section
8(b)(4)(A) [now Section 8(b)(4)(B)] than are the premises of an employer who 'al-
lys' himself with a primary employer. . . . Afortiori if an 'ally' is not sufficiently
neutral to permit a distinction to be drawn between it and the primary employer
for purposes of applying the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, Alexander's
Peoria and Urbana warehouses cannot be regarded as premises of a neutral em-
ployer here.
128 N.L.R.B. at 918-19.
116. The Board continued:
Thus, the continued operation of the Peoria and Urbana warehouses during Re-
spondents' strike at the Joliet warehouse, constituted, because of their proximity to,
and integration with, the Joliet warehouse, a factor which conceivably could have
been decisive in determining the outcome of the dispute, and Respondent could
legitimately extend their picketing to those premises.
Id. at 919.
117. Amalgamated Lithographers (Miami Post Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 968 (1961), enforce-
ment denied, 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962); Amalgamated Lithographers (The Employing Li-
thographers), 130 N.L.R.B. 985 (1961), mod#ed, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962).
118. 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 971 (1961), enforcement denied, 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961); 130
N.L.R.B. 985, 986-87 (1961), mod#Fed, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962).
119. 130 N.L.R.B. at 975.
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mated Lithographers of America, Local 17 (The Employing Lithographers),
however, on the ground that it permitted sympathy strikes in the plant of a
principal company when a subsidiary was on strike, even though the prin-
cipal and subsidiary did not constitute a single employer within the mean-
ing of the Act. 20
The Board was directly confronted with the argument that a corporation
should not be considered neutral in the labor disputes of its subsidiaries
in Miami Newspaper Printing Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.).212 The
union argued that since the corporation stood to profit directly from the
subsidiaries' operations, neutrality could be based only on the fiction of
corporate entity.'22 The trial examiner was unpersuaded, declaring that
the Board would not "pierce the corporate veil" unless there was evidence
of active common control. 123 Distinguishing Milwaukee Plywood's factual
involvement with companies possessing integrated operations, the Board
instead relied on The Employing Lithographers applying the common own-
ership and control test to corporate subsidiaries. 24
Neither the Board nor the trial examiner, however, squarely addressed
the union's argument in Knight Newspapers. The applicability of the sin-
gle employer doctrine to corporations and their subsidiaries received fuller
treatment in Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Exam-
iner, Division of The Hearst Corp.), 125 a case involving two unincorporated
divisions of The Hearst Corporation. The manager of each had responsi-
bility for day-to-day operations, as well as for labor, news, and production
policies. Each had its own financial system.' 26 Nonetheless, each division
was subject to financial reporting requirements, each needed Hearst's ap-
proval for expenditures over $10,000, and each was expected to remit ex-
cess profits to Hearst. 27 Viewing Hearst's exercise of authority over
financial matters as indicative of common ownership, the Board stated that
such authority constituted mere potential control. 128 Under these circum-
stances, the Board reasoned that the divisions would not have been consid-
ered a single employer had they been subsidiaries, and to deprive them of
statutory protection on the "technical ground" that they were merely divi-
120. 130 N.L.R.B. at 989.
121. 138 N.L.R.B. at 1346 (1962).
122. Id. at 1352.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1352-53.
125. 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971).
126. Id. at 304.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 304. See note 81 supra.
[Vol. 28:555
Single Employer Doctrine
sions of the corporation would thus exalt form over substance. 129 The
Board accordingly held that the divisions were separate persons. 30 Rec-
ognizing that section 2(1) of the Act' 3' does not specifically include corpo-
rate subdivisions as "persons" for purposes of section 8(b)(4), the Board
also held that the definition of persons in section 2(1) was not exclusive
and that the term "person" therefore included corporate subdivisions. 32
Because section 8(b)(4) had been amended in 1959 to substitute the broad
term "person" for "employer,"'' 33 the Board justified its holding as conso-
nant with the congressional intent to reduce the impact of labor disputes
by expanding the protection afforded by the section. 34 The Board thus
adhered to the test of actual control over day-to-day operations and labor
relations. 35 Dissenting Member Brown, however, argued that to restrict
the union's activity in this case would not prevent the spread of labor dis-
putes; instead, he saw the restriction as ultimately insulating the offending
employer from what was essentially its own dispute. 36 Emphasizing that
a corporate subdivision is not literally within the definition of person set
forth in section 2(1) and relying on a line of precedent which cautioned
against interpreting section 8(b)(4) to restrict primary activity, he charged
that the Board's decision extended section 8(b)(4)'s protection to an em-
ployer who had been made "fair game" by the Act. 137
The trial examiner also argued forcefully in favor of the conclusion that
the divisions constituted a single employer.' 38 In contrast to the Board,
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Section 2(l) states: "The term 'person' includes one or more individuals, labor orga-
nizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in
bankrupcy, or receivers." 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
132. 185 N.L.R.B. at 304-05.
133. Pub. L. No. 86-257, tit. II, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 525 (1959).
134. 185 N.L.R.B. at 305.
135. Id. at 305.
136. Id. at 307 (Brown, Member, dissenting and concurring).
137. Id. Member Brown also placed reliance on section 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 163 (1976), amended in 1947 when the Act's secondary boycott provision was enacted and
which states that "[niothing in this... [Act], except specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
138. 185 N.L.R.B. at 305. The trial examiner held that subdivisions were "persons"
within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(B). Id at 321. The trial examiner distinguished
Knight Newspapers on the grounds that it involved two corporate "persons" within the
meaning of section 8(b)(4)(i) & (ii) as contrasted with two parts of a single person in San
Francisco Examiner. Id. at 321. See note 131 supra. Both sides had contended that 41exan-
der Warehouse & Sales Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 916 (1960), controlled. The General Counsel and
the charging parties argued that but for the finding of integration, the picketing at issue
would have been secondary. Id. at 319. See note 116 and accompanying text, supra. The
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which focused only on the congressional intent to expand the protections
of section 8(b)(4), he pointed to the judicial recognition of the dual con-
gressional objectives of preserving the effectiveness of primary activity and
of protecting neutral employers from the pressures of controversies which
they did not create. 139 Emphasizing that the use of economic pressure is
essential to the collective bargaining process, he reasoned that Hearst's
right to use the operating profits of its divisions as "fuel for the total corpo-
rate body" and to support its divisions during labor disputes gave rise to a
correlative right in the union to picket the various divisions.140
In American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Baltimore News
American, Division of The Hearst Corp.),"4 the Board adopted the decision
of the trial examiner and again found two divisions of the Hearst Corpora-
tion to be separate employers.' 42 Using in terrorem reasoning, the trial
examiner concluded that the union's position would sanction extension of
the labor dispute to "everyone of Hearst's numerous divisions. . . in every
part of the country."' 143 Defining the primary employer as the entity in a
position to resolve a dispute, the trial examiner refused to permit an ex-
pansion of the labor conflict to entities which did not have the power to
resolve the dispute. 44 Finally, he rejected Alexander Warehouse as con-
trolling precedent because it was decided on the basis of integration of
operations, rather than on single employer grounds. 45 The Board's order,
based on these findings, was subsequently enforced by the District of Co-
unions argued that the language concerning integration of operations was dicta and that the
Board's statement concerning the ally doctrine, see note 115 supra, indicated its intention to
hold that a single corporation should, as a matter of law, be subject to picketing wherever it
does business, 185 N.L.R.B. at 319. However, the trial examiner found the case inapposite
because it did not involve construction of the term person. Id. at 320. Similarly, he distin-
guished Knight Newspapers on the ground that corporate subsidiaries are persons within
the meaning of sections 2(1) and 8(b)(4).
139. Id. at 320, quoting National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-27
(1967).
140. Id. at 320.
141. 185 N.LR.B. 593, 594 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
142. Id. at 594. Member Brown once again dissented, quoting the trial examiner's opin-
ion in San Francisco Examiner at length, and arguing that to construe section 2(1) to include
corporate divisions jeopardized the balance to be maintained in light of the "dual congres-
sional objectives" referred to by the trial examiner in that decision. Further, he once again
relied upon section 13 of the Act and pointed to precedent cautioning against interpreting
section 8(b)(4) to restrict direct economic pressures in primary labor disputes. Id. (Brown,
Member, dissenting). See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
143. Id. at 600. He declared that the union's argument looked not to the substance of the
corporation but to its form. Id.
144. Id. at 598, 600.
145. Id. at 600-01. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 28:555
Single Employer Doctrine
lumbia Circuit.146 Rather than adopting the dual objectives referred to by
the trial examiner in San Francisco Examiner, the court viewed the single
purpose of confining "labor conflicts to the employer in whose labor rela-
tions the conflict has arisen" as the relevant policy consideration.
147
In contrast to the reasoning adopted by the Board and the courts, the
unions' position in San Francisco Examiner and Baltimore News American
directly clashed with precedent establishing common ownership as an in-
sufficient ground for single employer status. 148 The unions' arguments
were apparently based on a technical interpretation of section 2(1). Their
real basis, however, could only have been the radical assertion that operat-
ing divisions of a corporation should be linked with the parent as a single
employer. This argument postulates that financial control is the most sig-
nificant criterion for single employer status and that a high degree of
financial control is almost always present over operating divisions. None-
theless, the Board and the courts have rejected this reasoning in cases of
common stock ownership by individuals, in which it is perhaps equally
applicable.' 49 In presenting their case, the unions were forced to accept
this precedent and thus to argue the inconsistent position that financial
control would be insufficient to indicate unity in some cases, yet sufficient
in others. Nonetheless, because the ultimate ability to employ financial
control over corporate subdivisions portends the concomitant ability to
subsidize those subdivisions experiencing economic pressure, the union
position has merit despite its inconsistency.
E The Subterfuge Doctrine
The development of subterfuge doctrines has played a significant role in
labor law, allowing the Board to see through an employer's attempts to
camouflage its unfair labor practices.'- 0 The essence of a subterfuge is the
use of a right or privilege by a party to obscure an underlying liability or
146. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
147. 462 F.2d at 890, quoting Miami Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 405, 410
(D.C. Cir. 1963). In Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Vulcan Materials Co.), 208 N.L.R.B.
540 (1974), enforced, 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977), the
Board, without further discussion, affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's reliance on the
Hearst cases in applying the common control test to divisions of the Vulcan Materials Com-
pany.
148. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
149. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87
N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
150. See, e.g., Armcor Industries, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 358 (1975), enforced in part, 535
F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976) (attempt to legitimate discriminatory discharge of union activist by
discharging another employee with him).
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vulnerability to legal action. 151 By using the subterfuge doctrine, the
Board or a court may ignore an asserted right or privilege and expose its
claimant to legal or economic sanctions. In the case of the single employer
doctrine, a subterfuge can exist if a company in fact operates commonly
owned businesses as one economic enterprise but arranges the day-to-day
operations of the businesses to give the appearance of independence.
Notwithstanding the subterfuge doctrine, such an arrangement would per-
mit the company to limit the economic sanctions arising in a labor dispute
afflicting one of its divisions. The application of the subterfuge doctrine,
however, would permit the Board or a court to expose all businesses of the
employer to strike or picketing activity.
In United Mine Workers of America (Lone Star Steel Co.), 152 the Board
held that an independent contractor hired to operate a mine owned by the
Lone Star Steel Company was an ally of that company and could be pick-
eted by the company's employees. The trial examiner based his holding
not only on the fact that Lone Star owned the coal and both used and
supervised the coal's excavation, but also on the fact that Lone Star had
previously mined the coal itself and apparently hired an independent con-
tractor in contemplation of an expected strike by its employees. ' 53 Endors-
ing the trial examiner's reasoning, the Board recognized the possibility that
an employer may intentionally change its operational structure in order to
foil employee attempts to exert economic pressure on it during a dis-
pute.154 Nonetheless, Lone Star Steel is not technically a single employer
case, however, but a co-employer case. 55 To date, the Board has failed to
promulgate a doctrine in single employer cases to deal with employer sub-
terfuge aimed at limiting the exercise of employee rights to exert primary
economic pressure. Nevertheless, two courts of appeals have laid a foun-
dation for a single employer subterfuge doctrine. In NLRB v. Local 810,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,'5 6 the Second Circuit reversed an
order in which the Board had declined to find that several commonly
owned companies were engaged in integrated operations, even though one
company served as the source of supply for several others acting as retail-
151. Compare Armcor Industries, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 358 (1975) with Local 391, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 1373, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(Bazelon, J, concurring),
enforcing 208 N.L.R.B. 540 (1974).
152. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1977).
153. Slip op. at 12.
154. Id. at 8.
155. See note 14 supra for an explanation of co-employer cases.




ers.' 57 The basis for the Board's decision was the absence of common con-
trol over day-to-day operations. 158 Rejecting this conclusory approach,
the court declared that the issue of neutrality must be resolved through an
ad hoc examination of the factual relationship between the primary and
the alleged secondary employer. 159 In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge
Mansfield further noted that the degree of domination and control of the
companies by the president and majority stockholder, "though only poten-
tial, was overwhelming," and that "each company was fundamentally de-
pendent on the others for its economic well-being."' 160 Criticizing the
Board for a mechanical application of the day-to-day control test, he ar-
gued that other factors may be more important and that a high degree of
common ownership and economic interdependence between two or more
companies should be sufficient for a finding of single employer status. 161
"Any other rule," he stated, "would permit the employer to divide and
conquer by doing business through several corporations, each comprising
one bargaining unit." 162
In Local 391, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 16 3 the
District of Columbia Circuit granted enforcement of a Board order deny-
ing single employer status to several operating divisions of a single corpo-
ration. 64 Stating that the independence of the operating divisions was
genuine and not an artifice devised for tactical or strategic purposes, the
court emphasized that an arrangement of intra-corporate functions specifi-
cally contrived to take advantage of the contours of the single employer
doctrine would not be honored. 165
Together, Local 810 and Local 391 form the basis for a workable sub-
terfuge doctrine. Certainly an employer should not be permitted to split
up the operations of one company or to form several companies to func-
tion as one in order to avoid the economic consequences of its own labor
disputes. However, merely looking for the separate and actual exercise of
day-to-day control is insufficient. It is possible for a parent corporation to
157. Local 810, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 189 N.L.R.B. at 613-15.
158. Id. at 616.
159. 460 F.2d at 6.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. The judge did not attempt to describe what other circumstances should be con-
sidered.
162. Id., quoting Levin, "Wholly Unconcerned" The Scope and Meaning of the.411, Doc-
trine Under Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 320 (1970).
163. 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977), enforcing 208
N.L.R.B. 540 (1974).
164. 543 F.2d at 1376.
165. Id. at 1376.
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set up subsidiaries or divisions in such a way that day-to-day operations
are managed locally, while ultimate control over fundamental decisions
and labor disputes is retained. Inquiry into day-to-day control is useful,
but the more fundamental question is whether the corporations or divi-
sions at issue are obtaining the economic benefits that would accrue from
operation as a single enterprise and, at the same time, avoiding the conse-
quences of major labor disputes which could affect the entire enterprise.
For such a purpose, the integration or the interdependence of financial
affairs is the most appropriate and fundamental test.
III. THE NEED FOR REVISION
In its current state, the single employer doctrine goes beyond protecting
"wholly unconcerned" employers from labor disputes not their own. In-
stead of balancing the dual congressional objectives of preserving the pri-
mary strike weapon and narrowing the area of labor disputes, the Board
and courts have given overriding deference to the latter at the expense of
the former. The Board's treatment of corporate giants, as exemplified in
the Hearst cases,166 illustrates this imbalance.
Labor disputes with corporate giants are, of all such disputes, most
likely to expand and have wide ranging economic consequences. The
Board's concern with the repercussions of such disputes is clear. At the
same time, however, it is precisely in cases involving corporate conglomer-
ates that unions are most disadvantaged economically, given the corpora-
tion's ability to transfer funds to divisions embroiled in labor dispute from
areas unaffected by strikes. In these cases, it would also seem that the "di-
vide and conquer" strategy is most likely to be effective because separate
incorporation is likely to be most efficient for massive operations. And,
while limiting the spread of labor disputes is a legitimate objective, it is not
the sole objective to be considered. The right to strike can be meaningful
only if there is a possibility that the strike weapon will be effective. Conse-
quently, the Board and courts should safeguard the effectiveness of strikes
by permitting their use whenever the economic realities of a situation indi-
cate that a union's real adversary is not merely the immediate employer,
but a commonly owned company.
The single greatest threat to the strike weapon is common financial con-
trol, a factor specifically rejected by the Board and courts as determinative
of single employer status. Common financial control has two conse-
quences, however, which should make its consideration paramount. First,
it insures that the struck employer is interested in a dispute beyond mere
166. See text accompanying notes 125-47 supra.
[Vol. 28:555
Single Employer Doctrine
buying and selling, and it therefore becomes a limitation on the expansion
of disputes. In contrast to an exception based on mere buying and selling
which would legitimate virtually al secondary boycotts, one based on
common financial control would occur less frequently. Second, common
financial control substantially limits the effectiveness of a strike by al-
lowing the struck employer to draw on a greater pool of financial re-
sources. Furthermore, interference with the effectiveness of a strike has
been a primary rationale behind the struck work doctrine; arguably, it also
should form part of the rationale for the single employer doctrine.
To say that common financial control should be the most relevant factor
is not to say that the tests currently applied are unimportant. Integration
of operations, although inappropriately used by the Board and courts to
narrow the single employer exception, is a practical means of determining
the natural boundaries of dispute. Two functionally integrated employers
are likely to be seriously affected by each other's labor disputes, and the
more exclusively one business deals with another, the less likely other busi-
nesses will be affected by a dispute. Additionally, common labor relations
policies, although also misused to narrow the exception, are likewise rele-
vant. By any standard, it would be harsh to deny a labor union the ability
to use the economic strike weapon against the party actually determining
the terms and conditions of employment of its members. Common control
over day-to-day operations, however, would seem to be significant only as
an indicator either of common financial control or of integration of opera-
tions. Finally, the existence of an arms-length relationship between two
businesses seems the most inappropriate of the tests applied when the ap-
pearance of an arms-length relationship can easily disguise the actual and
substantial control over related businesses.
It is not a contradiction of the single employer doctrine that factors other
than financial control, such as the integration of operations or common
labor relations policies, may make one employer a concerned party to an-
other's labor disputes even in the absence of common ownership. Nothing
in the legislative history of section 8(b)(4) precludes either the application
of a financial control test or the elimination of the common ownership
requirement in appropriate cases. 167 Nevertheless, for an expansion of the
single employer doctrine to occur, the Board and courts must begin to ar-
167. The Board has begun such an expansion of the single employer doctrine in its co-
employer cases, see note 14 supra. The Fifth Circuit has also initiated an expansion of the
doctrine based on integration of operations in the absence of common ownership. See Vul-
can Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
963 (1971); Truckdrivers Local 728 v. Empire State Express, 293 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
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ticulate the reasons behind particular tests which have been invoked for
close to thirty years.
IV Conclusion
The single employer doctrine is a judicial and Board made exception to
the National Labor Relations Act's prohibition on secondary boycotts.
Under this doctrine, companies which are commonly owned may be
treated as a single employer if their operations are functionally integrated,
if there is a substantial degree of common control over day-to-day opera-
tions, or if there is a common labor relations policy over daily affairs. All
three factors are considered in determining single employer status. The
primary consequence of such a determination is that a union striking one
employer will be able to strike or picket the second employer.
In their application of the doctrine, the Board and courts have been in-
sensitive to the potential impact on labor disputes by the common financial
control of two or more companies. Since common financial control allows
one company to aid another in its labor disputes, it thus may be a determi-
native factor in such disputes. A union therefore should be allowed to
extend its strike or picketing activity to such companies in appropriate cir-
cumstances. The tests applied by the Board and courts in determining sin-
gle employer status are unduly restrictive, however, and emphasize the
absence of common control over day-to-day operations at the expense of
potential tactical advantages enjoyed by the companies in question. In its
present state, the single employer doctrine is a basically pro-union doctrine
which has been applied to favor employers and is deserving of revision by
the Board and courts.
Katherine Sciacchitano
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